

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06MANAGUA745, ALLQ,S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, ASSERTS AGUIRRE SACASA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06MANAGUA745**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MANAGUA745	2006-04-04 22:48	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Managua

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu>

VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0745/01 0942248
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 042248Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5825
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0611
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000745

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: [KDEM](#) [NU](#) [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [PREL](#)
SUBJECT: ALLQ,S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, ASSERTS AGUIRRE SACASA

REF: A. MANAGUA 0738
[1](#)B. MANAGUA 0709
[1](#)C. MANAGUA 0720
[1](#)D. 2005 MANAGUA 3025

Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: Francisco Aguirre Sacasa, until recently a presidential-hopeful for the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC), is disappointed with PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman's decision to influence the outcome of the PLC's selection of its presidential candidate. He believes that Aleman's hold on conventioners enabled Jose Rizo to garner three times the votes he merited, enabling Rizo to avoid a runoff vote. Aguirre Sacasa asserted that, in an unencumbered primary, he would have been the candidate facing Rizo or Enrique Quinonez in a runoff. To Aguirre Sacasa, the overriding objective now is to beat Ortega and the Sandinistas, who are 'loaded for bear and will do whatever it takes to win.' He appears willing to encourage the PLC to accept primaries that include departmental deputies as the price for uniting the anti-Sandinista forces. His assessment that Aleman will likely reject the primary proposal is probably on mark. The question is how Rizo will respond to the offer. End Summary.

The Finger

- - - - -

[1](#)2. (C) Francisco Aguirre Sacasa, former Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States, and until recently a presidential-hopeful for the PLC, related to polcouns on April 3 his disappointment with PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman's decision to influence the outcome of the PLC's March 31 departmental and April 2 national conventions to select its presidential candidate (Ref A). Aguirre Sacasa opined that convention winner Jose Rizo garnered three times the votes he merited because of Aleman's "instructions" ("dedazo," or finger) to party conventioners to vote for Rizo. If the convention had been unencumbered, Aguirre Sacasa believes no candidate would have won on the first round (requiring 51% of the votes), and that he and Rizo, or possibly Enrique Quinonez, would have competed in the runoff.

[1](#)3. (C) Aleman's last-minute addition of 200 conventioners to his liking clearly stacked the decks in his candidate Rizo's favor, argued Aguirre Sacasa, lamenting that he had no time to lobby these newly branded conventioners. He related that Aleman opposed Quinonez' candidacy and decided that Rizo was a safer, more palatable candidate. Polcouns offered that perhaps Daniel Ortega was the "hand" behind Aleman's finger and had instructed Aleman that Rizo, not Quinonez, is an acceptable candidate.

¶4. (C) Nonetheless, Aguirre Sacasa has resigned himself to the situation, opining that Rizo would make a "decent" president and sharing that Aleman has offered him the vice presidency. He claimed that rival presidential candidates Eduardo Montealegre (ALN-PC) and Daniel Ortega (FSLN) have approached him with the same offer. Of course, he would never consider an alliance with Ortega, but he esteems Montealegre.

¶5. (C) To Aguirre Sacasa, the overriding objective at this point is to beat Ortega. "Like the famous Shakespearean play, 'all's well that ends well.' If the Liberals unite we will win; if we are divided, Ortega will win," he warned, predicting that Ortega would receive 42% of the votes, Rizo 32%, and others (Montealegre and Lewites) 26%. Aguirre Sacasa disparaged the accuracy of the polls, which currently show Montealegre and Lewites in the lead, although he admitted that Rizo enjoys little popular support and acknowledged that Montealegre enjoys much more support than Rizo, at least for now.

LOADED FOR BEAR

- - - - -

¶6. (C) According to Aguirre Sacasa, this time around Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas are determined to win the election. "They are loaded for bear and will do whatever it takes to win. A divided Liberalism plays into their hands," warned Aguirre Sacasa. He ventured that Herty will draw more votes from the Liberals than Ortega and could eventually withdraw from the race. Polcouns replied that the polls suggest Lewites could attract some 15% of FSLN votes, a sizeable sum, and perhaps more because many poll respondents hesitate to indicate their choice out of fear of a FSLN reprisal.

LAST CALL FOR PRIMARIES

- - - - -

¶7. (C) Aguirre Sacasa mentioned that everyone is eager to hear the U.S. Ambassador's proposal for primaries. He believes that the PLC will be willing to enter into inter-party primaries, if it only encompasses presidential candidates. Indeed, in January the PLC had offered inter-party primaries, but Montealegre rejected them and the Embassy did not support them. Polcouns remarked that Jose Antonio Alvarado had submitted a counter offer, close to what the IRI proposed months ago, but that to our knowledge, the PLC had never responded to Alvarado's offer. Further, polcouns explained that the USG will never support a primary under Aleman's hegemony; his rigging of the PLC primaries is evidence that he cannot be trusted. Aguirre Sacasa, who took credit for proposing the inter-party primaries, explained that once he started campaigning, he left the task to others, adding that he was unaware that the PLC had never replied to Alvarado's initiative.

¶8. (C) Polcouns remarked that the Embassy initiative includes departmental deputies and entails creating an inter-party working group independent from Aleman to coordinate the primaries. Aguirre Sacasa remarked that he personally favors the inclusion of departmental deputies, but he doubts the PLC will accept primaries for departmental deputies because Aleman wishes to control their selection. Polcouns replied that if Rizo is determined to distance himself from Aleman, as Rizo has asserted to us, supporting primaries for departmental deputies might be a worthy litmus test of his commitment and independence.

COMMENT

- - - - -

¶9. (C) Aguirre Sacasa still feels the burn from Aleman's machinations. He appears willing to encourage the PLC to accept broader primaries, but he may not get far. His assessment that Aleman will likely reject them to maintain control of the deputy selection process is probably on mark.

The question is how Rizo will do respond to the offer. Rizo may find an excuse to refuse the inter-party primaries. Alluding to Eduardo Montealegre, Rizo informed Ambassador on April 4 that he would accept the offer only if the other presidential aspirants are selected via their own internal primaries.

TRIVELLI